( Israel faces many challenges. Yet, while it was certainly disappointing to learn that a former Israeli President was convicted of rape, in other ways the fact that a former top government official can be charged and convicted, demonstrates the vibrancy of Israeli’s democratic system. That system remains challenged and even threatened by its present coalition structure. This article is written in that light, and also with my fervent hope that as we enter 2011 key changes in that structure can be made. While parts of the following article have been previously published, and it is much longer than usual, hopefully you will find that it stimulates thought …….or at least fills the gap between New Year’s football games!)
If we survey American Jews that are at least moderately engaged on
the topic of Israel, and ask them what they see as the greatest
existential threats Israel faces, Iran would certainly lead the list.
Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria would likely follow. Maybe Turkey would
make the list, too, especially if its traditionally secular society
(supported by Turkey’s largely pro-Israeli military leadership)
ultimately loses out to its growing anti-Israeli and Islamist AKP
ruling party. (In fact, Turkey’s National Security Council recently
dropped Syria and Iran as threats at the same time it added Israel as
a “central threat.”)
Some might cite the failure to achieve a two state solution and the
possible worsening violence arising from that. Katyusha and Qassam
rockets and other upgraded military weaponry are no longer yesterday’s
inaccurate and distance-limited tactical threats. Israel now faces a
strategic threat that extends to every major city in Israel, not just
southern and northern border towns.
Others could go Israeli opposition leader’s Tzipi Livni’s way and
cite the existential threat of the loss or reduction in American
support for Israel as America tires of the seemingly endless conflict,
and retrenches to deal with its own “closer to home” problems.
Supporters of ultra-nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu party head Avigdor
Lieberman, Israel’s official Lone Ranger and head of the Go It
Alone wing of Israeli foreign policy, might even add Israel’s Arab
citizens as an existential threat: After all, Yisrael Beiteinu
supporters’ reason, how can Israel survive with 20% (and growing!) of
its potentially disloyal “enemy” living within the Jewish state of
Israel and enjoying all the same rights as Jews? (Interestingly,
while most of the Arab population has long and loyal roots in Israel,
the roots of the ultra-nationalists within Yisrael Beiteinu are mostly
of Russian origin and perspective.)
But, Iran would widely lead the poll rankings, and we wouldn’t even
need to use the BCS computers to weigh other factors, such as the
strength of Iran’s Israeli and American opposition or Iran’s home
field hiding nukes advantage. An Iran with nukes, combined with a
Holocaust denying leader who regularly seems to relish making
Israel-destroying threats, deserves the existential threat trophy.
Many Arab League members would also likely give Iran the trophy as the
Middle East’s greatest threat.
Just the presence of Iranian nukes would be a game changer for the
entire region. It would tend to encourage other Arab states to
engage in a counterbalancing Pakistan/India type of nuclear arms race
that virtually no amount of incentives or disincentives could control.
While the Middle East is hardly an island of tranquility now, imagine
Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other nuclear
hopefuls, all engaged in some variation of nuclear weapon production,
acquisition or distribution. Once the nuclear weapons party gets
going, it won’t take long for it to turn into a nuclear weapons rave.
Hopefully, America and Israel will find the right mix of diplomatic
tricks and treats to prevent the party getting started, and there is
still reason to hope for success, but an Iran with THE bomb is only
one type of “existential threat” bomb Israel faces.
There is another potentially even more lethal bomb that should be on
American Jewry’s existential threat lists. The threat of this bomb is
that it is not as noticeable or as immediate of a concern.
U.N. inspectors would never find it. Established Jewish
organizations like AIPAC, AJC and the ADL rarely, if ever, mention it.
The Jewish Federation, the United Way of Jewish giving, appears to
offer no identifiable funding to study or stop it. Even newer Jewish
organizations, like J Street, aren’t focused on it.
A ”google search” for information on this bomb yields little. And
when there is information, it is usually presented in such an
unalarming manner that it’s hard to conclude that this bomb is as
lethal as it really is.
It’s actually three bombs conflated into one expanding demographic
time bomb: Take one portion Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), one portion
Israeli Arab and add an ultra-nationalistic immigrant trigger. Slowly
mix them all together. What’s left is a huge population growth bomb
timed less to explode than to insidiously seep into the political,
social and religious fabric of Israeli society.
As it seeps, the threat is that the seepage creates Livni’s worst
nightmare: This demographic time bomb could actually change Israeli
society to such an extent that Israelis, outside the Haredi,
ultra-nationalist and Arab groups, start to leave Israel, further
exacerbating the demographic problem. As this occurs, even currently
strongly pro-Israel American Jews may find themselves having a harder
time supporting an Israel that increasingly struggles to demonstrate
the moral, ethical and civil rights values they hold dear.
At present, the Israeli population mix breaks down to approximately 8%
Haredi, 15% ultra-nationalist, and 20% Arab. Based on the younger
ages and higher birth rates of the Haredi and Israeli Arab sectors,
and excluding emigration and immigration factors, several demographic
studies suggest that within as little as ten years the Haredi
population will increase to around 15% and the Arab population will
rise to near 25%. If the ultra-nationalists remain at 15% —
protecting Israel from its internal non-Jewish population threats does
leave ultra-nationalists with less procreating time than the Haredi
and Arabs seem to have — this means that these three groups will
represent over half of Israel’s population.
What does this mean for Israel? What does this mean for Diaspora
Jewish support for Israel?
Unfortunately, many American Jews seem more intent on arguing about
what Jewish organizations best offer support to Israel (AIPAC? J
Street? ADL? AJC?) rather than focusing on what should be the most
important concern: Is Israel at risk of losing its core Jewish support
as the Loyalist generation that supported and still supports the idea
of Israel as a Jewish refuge and a “light unto the world” is
supplanted by a younger, less attached ”show me” generation.
This generation looks less at how events in Europe in the 1800′s led
Herzl to found a Zionist movement that led to Balfour and finally a
state of Israel, than to what they perceive as “facts on the ground”
today: They see a Jewish state, yet they recognize their Judaism much
more within America’s borders than within Israel’s.
Considering Israel’s current demographic trends, this feeling is
unlikely to change absent significant internal changes within Israel.
Struggles over terrorism, loyalty oaths, the ultra-Orthodox defining
who is a Jew, Israeli Arab housing and education deficiencies,
separation barriers, government subsidies to the Haredi, lack of a
skilled Haredi work force, and Arab and Haredi exemptions from serving
in the military, will likely grow worse and expand to even other
issues as Israel becomes less secular and less democratic.
Is it too apocalyptic to suggest that a country with an increasing mix
of religious, but non-working and/or less skilled citizens depending
on a disproportionate amount of government subsidies, combined with
another group that is stridently nationalistic and wants a “purer”
Israel, preferably devoid of Arabs, with more land for Jews, combined
with Israeli Arab citizens that have lived better than their
Palestinian brethren, but who are not as attached to the concept of
Israel as a Jewish state, and that in many ways live in a society that
supports official and unofficial discrimination against them, is not
a very stable (or supportable) mix?
Maybe it’s a mix that Pastor Hagee’s CUFI (Christians United for
Israel) will still support — his Christian organization now bills
itself as the largest pro Israel organization in America — but for
Israel to survive and thrive it needs stable Jewish support. And
Israel’s long term needs are best met by implementing the internal
reforms necessary to prevent the demographic time bomb from
jeopardizing that.
It’s not too late. Yet. But, in order to ensure a stable economy and
society as well as consistent and long-term Jewish support, Israel
must implement the internal reforms necessary to prevent its
demographic time bomb from exploding.
NEUTRALIZING THE HAREDI BOMB IS THE KEY STEP
David Ben-Gurion’s great bargain has become Israel’s great burden. It
is a burden that threatens Israel’s survival as the type of Jewish
state that Ben-Gurion and other original Zionists imagined.
During the 1940′s, Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, joined
with many of Israel’s other secular Zionist founders in deciding that
they needed the “ultra-Orthodox” Haredi leaders on the Zionist
team. The Haredim, it was felt, would be critical in assisting the
“grand Zionist experiment” in passing its difficult opening act. It is
hard enough, after all, to debut in a hail of bombs and bullets. If
you also have to include anti-Zionist Jewish cast members that view
secular Zionists as heretics, and doubt their own country’s
legitimacy, it would be hard to get much past opening night and a
world full of critics.
To secure ”ultra-Orthodox” support, Ben-Gurion made a political
deal. The Haredim, “guardians of authentic Judaism,” would embrace
Israel’s founding, despite their misgivings that a largely secular
Israeli society would negatively impact the Jewish people’s faith in
the coming of the future Messiah. In return, Haredi leaders would
receive a significant (and now dangerous) Messiah preemption
concession: The rabbinate would gain control over marriage, divorce
and almost all related family law. Yeshiva students would get a
military service exemption. And the Haredim, a tiny percentage of
Israel’s original population, and a group that some, including Israeli
journalist Yossi Sarid, have referred to as the “Jewish Taliban,”
would now have a power base to enforce their fundamentalist views on
Israeli, and world Jewry.
What Israel’s founding Zionist fathers never imagined (or at least
decided to put off imagining) was that the ancient belief system and
insular ways of the Haredim could avoid eventual co-option by the
allure of a modern successful Jewish society. The idea that the
Haredi interpretation of halachah, Jewish religious law, would be
embedded in Israeli society, instead of excised from it, was not
considered.
Fast forward to 2010.
It’s Israel itself that is actually in the process of being co-opted
by both Ashkenazi and Sephardi Mizrachi Haredi. Israel’s truly whacky
coalition governing system — win as little as 2% of the vote and you,
too, can participate — allows them to have influence far beyond their
numbers (8% to 10% of the population) and certainly well beyond
their low popular support both inside and outside of Israel.
Where the Haredi, particularly the Sephardic Haredim, are likely to
lead is in the “most likely to give a platform to those who seek to
delegitimize Israel” vote. Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, their Shas Party’s
spiritual leader, has interpreted halachah to mandate that Jews not
sell property to Arabs, and that judges not participate in minyans.
(Yosef isn’t a secular judge fan. He supports his own religious
interpretations over judge-interpreted laws. And it’s not because
he’s watched too much ”Court TV” or read about too many activist
judges. Haredim aren’t big fans of modernity. That might lead to
losing their community control. So television, newspapers and the
internet don’t typically make their shopping lists.)
Yosef even recently said that his interpretation of halachah is that
an Arab’s only purpose is to serve Jews. He also wished death upon Abu
Mazen, the head of the Palestinian Authority. (While most of Israel’s
political leaders, as well as American Jewish organizations like
AIPAC, ADL, AJC and J Street, condemned Yosef’s remarks, the
Haredi-supported Shas Party did not. Shas remains a major Netanyahu
coalition party member, and also remains a key player in poisoning
Israeli politics and the view of Israel throughout the world.)
The ”ultra-Orthodox” are also unique in that they are consistently on
the opposite side of the Israeli majority, yet are able to maintain
their coalition toehold: Haredim strongly support the settlements in
all areas of the West Bank; they see Jews as the entitled landowners.
Yet, which Jews are entitled is not always clear, as they seek to
define “real Jews” in such a restrictive manner that qualifying for
their club can be very difficult (and off-putting to Diaspora Jewry).
And they don’t support a two state solution or having to work.
Studying Torah, or ”pray for pay,” is their state supported
“occupation.” Over 60% of Haredim don’t work and are forced to have
their needs met by charity and state subsidies.
Haredi schooling is also based on the principle of separate and
unequal, at least in terms of their unwillingness to teach core
required subjects, like math and science, or to treat educating girls
the same as educating boys. Ashkenazi and Sephardic Haredi Jews have
also received different educational opportunities. But at least
Haredim do come close to leading Israel society in one key metric:
their poverty rate. The “ultra-Orthodox,” half of whom exist below
the poverty line, trail only the Arab sector.
Where Haredi do lead, and this is what poses a growing danger to
Israel, is in their birth rate and their relative youthfulness,
compared to the rest of Israeli society. An average Haredi family has
seven to eight (heavily state-supported) children compared to slightly
under four (less heavily state-supported) children for Arab families,
and slightly under three (much less state-supported) children in
non-Haredi Jewish families. By 2020, several demographers suggest that
Haredim will increase to 15% of the population. Combined with the
roughly 15% of Israel society who are now considered “ultra
nationalists” — largely immigrants from Russia — and the 20% (likely
to be 25% by 2025) Arab sector, Israel is left with a strangely
antagonistic mix of citizens.
Haredim don’t believe that many of the ultra-nationalists qualify as
Jews according to halacha. To the great disappointment of the
Haredim, while many of the ultra-nationalists resent this, even more
appear not to care. While the ultra-nationalists’ ”non-Jewish”
status affects various aspects of their social life, a large portion
of this group is more focused on working to transfer different
segments of the the Arab population outside Israel or at least
preventing them from enjoying equal rights and privileges. Haredim
keenly love playing this game, too.
The Arab sector, in turn, grows increasingly frustrated by their
marginalization — no Arab party has ever participated in the
government — and by the de facto and de jure discrimination they
suffer. They see themselves as legitimate citizens entitled to enjoy
at least the same rights as the relatively newcomer
ultra-nationalists and the Haredim, who they feel don’t contribute as
much to the non-spiritual economy as they do. Arabs reject the “fifth
column” label that many of the ultra-nationalists have applied, and
say they have proven to be loyal citizens.
What can be done?
The single most important change that needs to happen, for Israel’s
internal social, economic and political good, as well as to ensure
continued strong external American government and American Jewish
support, is on Benjamin Netanyahu’s and Tzipi Livni’s shoulders. These
two leaders need to bring their Kadima and Likud parties together in a
new coalition government that, along with the moderate Labor Party,
would allow Netanyahu to drop the corrosive and stifling influence of
four current coalition members: the ultra-nationalist Yisrael Beitenu
party and the ultra-religious Shas, United Torah, and The Jewish Home
parties. (While “ultra-nationalist” and “ultra-religious” may be
pejorative terms, they seem to best describe the exclusivist platforms
of these parties.)
This one change would free up a new coalition government to make the
types of far-sighted changes Israel needs.
The new coalition government will have the leverage to work with
Haredi leadership to require and enforce a core educational curricula
that includes math and science. This will make it easier for Haredim
to succeed in the economy and easier for the government to gradually
eliminate subsidies. The government will also be better positioned to
enforce the same military service requirements that are now, with the
exception of Arab Israelis, imposed on the rest of Israeli society.
Perhaps some Haredi can be given alternate ways to fulfill their
military service. But, what is important for every Haredi Israeli to
understand is that the obligations the state has to, in this case its
“ultra-Orthodox” citizens, must be married to the obligations its
“ultra-Orthodox” citizens have to the state. At present, the balance
too heavily tilts the state in the Haredi direction.
Ben-Gurion’s original bargain with Haredi leadership does not mean it
must continue in perpetuity. Israel is 62 years, six major conflicts
and two Palestinian uprisings later. And as Israel continues to face
an Iranian existential threat, it can’t afford to allow an internal
one that also has serious external ramifications for Diaspora Jewry.
That means that Israel must also reduce the Haredi role over civil
issues such as marriage, divorce and burial, which ties in with
eliminating their ability to define “who is a Jew.” These changes
can be negotiated in the context of negotiating over Haredi financial
subsidies, educational changes and compulsory military service, but
the process must begin now.
A true coalition government would also be able to more easily take
steps to improve funding for the Arab sector and work toward
eliminating the direct and indirect discrimination encouraged by the
ultra-nationalists and some religious parties and perpetuated by the
current Israeli political, economic and religious structure. A
coalition government should also dialogue with key Arab leaders about
the value, especially as conditions improve in the region, of
eventually requiring some type of military service commitment for Arab
citizens. So many business-related connections are now tied, at least
indirectly, into military service, that the absence of a requirement
can operate as an impediment to economic advancement.
As these changes occur, and as a coalition government more easily
navigates a path toward an agreement with the Palestinians, Israel’s
Arab population will become more productive and more able to proudly
identify themselves as Israeli citizens, rather than as Arab Israelis
or Palestinians.
Make no mistake. Change is tough. Livni and Netanyahu will each have
to make concessions. But while their journey will be fraught with
serious twists and turns and self-doubts, reaching a decision to unite
in a coalition government and travel down a path toward implementing
the necessary societal changes, will ultimately lead to the right
destination for Israel and all of its internal and external
supporters.
